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The last fifty years of development aid have not been rewarded with success. Part of the reason for this failure has 
been the focus on macro approaches and policies, which did not emphasize the local institutional context faced by eco-
nomic agents. 
In the last decade, the notion of institutions has come to the forefront of policy advice. At the same time however, the 
role of institutions in economic development remains unclear. As a result, it is being challenged by those who think that 
institutions are just the fad of the moment. 
This Policy Primer explains how institutions are vital to the expansion of entrepreneurial activity, which is at the 
heart of the process of development and economic growth. What is generally missing in countries with lackluster eco-
nomic performance is not entrepreneurship as such but the right institutional context for entrepreneurship to take place 
and to be socially beneficial. What matters for development are the rules that individuals follow and how these rules are 
defined and enforced. 
In a successful economy, formal rules are aligned with informal norms and foster entrepreneurial activity by defin-
ing and enforcing property rights. The aim of economic policy and social reform must be to re-establish an institutional 
framework that allows for socially productive entrepreneurial activity to flourish by reducing the cost of engaging in 
productive activities. This Policy Primer offers three policy implications: define a starting point for reform; build insti-
tutional capacity; prepare an environment that favors productive entrepreneurship. 
In spite of the uncertainty surrounding the path to reform, it is important to keep in mind that the quality of the for-
mal and informal institutions is the main determinant of productive entrepreneurship. 
 
1. Introduction1 
After half a century of efforts in development aid, “insti-
tutions” have come, in the last few years, to the forefront of 
policy advice. Many organizations involved in fostering 
development and helping transition economies have adopt-
ed the view that institutions matter, and mainstream eco-
nomics pays more and more attention to the notion of in-
stitutions. At the same time however, the role of institu-
tions in economic development remains unclear for many, 
and as a result it is being challenged by those who think 
that institutions are just the fad of the moment. 
This Policy Primer explains how institutions are vital to 
the expansion of entrepreneurial activity, which is at the 
heart of the process of development and economic growth 
and that the concept of institution is, when given real con-
tent and not merely used as a buzzword, not just another 
fad in economics but a crucial component of successful 
policymaking. 
It is argued in the following pages that what is generally 
missing in countries with lackluster economic performance 
is not entrepreneurship per se but the right institutional 
context for entrepreneurship to take place and to be social-
ly beneficial. Therefore, what matters for development and 
entrepreneurial activity are the rules that individuals follow 
and how these rules are defined and enforced. 
The fundamental message of this Policy Primer is that 
unless the formal rules (a) are aligned with the informal 
norms that individuals follow, (b) favor entrepreneurial 
activity (i.e. define and enforce property rights, the law of 
contracts, etc.), and (c) are effectively enforced in an envi-
                                                             
1 Frederic Sautet, Senior Fellow, Mercatus Center 
ronment that operates under a rule of law, development 
and sustained prosperity cannot become a reality. 
 
This Policy Primer is divided into three parts: 
▪ An analysis of institutions and entrepreneurship; 
▪ An empirical illustration from a Mercatus Center field 
study: Entrepreneurial activity in rural Romania; and, 
▪ Implications for development policy. 
▪ Effective policy reform begins with a credible baseline 
that considers the informal as well as formal institu-
tional structure and takes the perceptions of local eco-
nomic actors into account. 
▪ Successful reforms build the institutional capacity 
necessary for their implementation. 
▪ Successful reforms will prepare the environment for 
“productive entrepreneurship” by reducing the cost of 
engaging in productive activities relative to engaging in 
evasive or socially destructive economic activities. 
2. Analysis 
Most economists and policy makers would agree that 
institutions and entrepreneurship are important compo-
nents of a prosperous society. The aim of this analysis is to 
explain how a robust institutional environment and entre-
preneurial activity are important to development and eco-
nomic performance by showing how they interact with one 
another. In other words, this analysis presents a short but 
detailed analysis of how institutions shape entrepreneur-
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Institutions 
It is not always clear what economists and policy mak-
ers mean by the term “institutions”. For instance, institu-
tions are sometimes confused with organizations. However, 
as Nobel Prize winning economist Douglass North ex-
plains: “Institutions are the rules of the game in a society 
or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that 
shape human interaction” (1990 p. 3)2. Institutions are 
simply the rules and norms that individuals follow in their 
daily lives, the formal and informal constraints and their 
enforcement characteristics. 
To use the analogy of sport, institutions are akin to the 
rules that allow tennis players to know what they can or 
cannot do. Without these rules, there would be no tennis, 
as no one could devise a way to play and win. A sport re-
quires rules that frame the behavior of each participant. 
Similarly institutions in society are the rules that provide 
the framework within which people interact3. 
Institutions provide guidance, allow for routines to de-
velop and ultimately reduce the uncertainty of social inter-
action. These functions are all faces of the same coin but 
can be analytically distinguished to better flesh out the role 
institutions play. 
If institutions frame the behavior of individuals, they al-
so, as a consequence, structure the incentives that individ-
uals face in their activities. In other words, if one cannot 
win at tennis by playing outside the lines or letting the ball 
bounce twice, then the players will be motivated to develop 
the capabilities to play within the boundaries and to always 
run to return the ball before it bounces a second time. If I 
know that I can only win by playing within the lines, it will 
force me to become good at hitting the ball within the lim-
its of the court. This will also guide my actions and my ex-
pectations regarding what my opponent in the game can or 
cannot do4. 
By guiding actions, institutions facilitate social interac-
tion in our daily lives. For instance, driving on the right-
hand side of the street is a rule which guides motorists in 
ways that permit the coordination of cars. Such a coordina-
tion of vehicles happens because everyone follows the same 
rule, which facilitates the choices drivers must make on the 
road. As North explains, it is the existence of an imbedded 
set of institutions in our daily lives which removes many 
                                                             
2 Institutions taken together with the individuals taking advantage 
of them and seeking to achieve some common goals are called 
organizations. 
3 See Douglas North (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change and 
Economic Performance, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. As North puts it: “institutions include any form of con-
straints that human beings devise to shape human interaction” 
North (1990: 4). See also North (2005) Understanding the Pro-
cess of Economic Change, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
4 In this sense, institutions are “a guide to human interaction, so 
that when we wish to greet friends on the street, drive an auto-
mobile, buy oranges, borrow money, form a business, bury our 
dead, or whatever, we know (or can learn easily) how to per-
form these tasks… In the jargon of the economist, institutions 
define and limit the set of choices of individuals” North (1990: 
3-4). 
difficult choices that, in the absence of institutions, would 
have to be made in order to obtain social interaction5. On 
the road, we don’t have to choose which side to drive on 
every time we encounter another vehicle because we all 
accept and follow the same rule. 
It follows that institutions reduce the uncertainty of so-
cial interaction by providing a structure within which eve-
ryone can act. This function is very important because it 
allows for the coordination of plans. Indeed, one could not 
interact socially in the total absence of knowledge about 
what guides the actions of others in the social context. If I 
don’t know the rules which my opponent will follow, I can-
not engage myself in a tennis game because it would be too 
uncertain. The same is true in the “economic game”. Be-
cause institutions guide human action in the social context, 
they reduce the uncertainty of social interaction. To go 
back to the “rules of the road” example, the uncertainty 
every driver faces with regard to the actions of every other 
driver is reduced by the existence of rules. Because of rules, 
driving on the road is more certain. 
With this analysis in mind, it is easy to understand that 
in order for institutions to reduce uncertainty, they must be 
as stable and predictable as possible over time so that they 
can be used as guiding tools in social interaction. 
Institutions can take the form of both formal and infor-
mal rules. Institutions can be formal and explicit such as 
the US Constitution. They can also be informal and implicit 
such as behavioral social codes that are accepted by most 
(in culturally homogenous groups) but written nowhere 
(e.g. social rules of courtesy towards elderly people). 
The rules of tennis referenced above are formal: they 
are written down in the official International Tennis Feder-
ation rulebook. However, constraints on human behavior 
don’t have to be formal and explicit to operate. In fact, con-
ventions and social codes of behavior are everywhere and 
change depending on the social environment. For instance, 
while formal tennis rules are written and detailed, they 
don’t cover everything about tennis. Tennis players also 
follow unwritten rules: these are rules about courtesy, 
warming-up, serving, making calls, disputes, etc.6 
The distinction between formal and informal institu-
tions is at the core of the economics of institutions. The 
rules that govern social intercourse are generally not lim-
ited to formal institutions; they also include informal (i.e. 
unwritten) norms of conduct that individuals follow in 
their day-to-day activities. The institutions that matter to 
individuals are those that they follow (whether formal or 
informal). Taking the formal/informal distinction into ac-
count is crucial when designing policies that are intended 
to influence the behavior of people. 
As we will see below, economic performance suffers 
when formal and informal rules don’t overlap. This is typi-
cally the case when the formal rules do not reflect the in-
formal norms of conduct. 
                                                             
5 North (1990: 22). 
6 The same is true of spectators at tennis tournaments: they follow 
unwritten behavioral rules. Notice the difference in behavior 
between tennis spectators and football or basketball fans, for 
instance. 
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Institutions only affect people’s behavior when they are 
enforced. In situations where there is no overlap between 
formal and informal rules, and formal institutions cannot 
be enforced properly, it is the informal rules that take pri-
ority. This makes the enforcement of the formal rules diffi-
cult and costly7. 
Enforcement can take many forms, be it a fine for vio-
lating the rules of the road or a sneer when showing disre-
spect toward an elderly person. The enforcement costs of 
the formal institutional structure increase as the overlap 
between formal and informal rules shrinks. The smaller the 
overlap, the more difficult it will be for policy makers to 
have an effect on individuals’ behavior and the more ex-
pensive the enforcement of the formal system will become. 
Without a reasonably good knowledge of the informal 
institutions that exist in society, policy makers cannot re-
form the formal institutions and assume that they will 
“stick”. Whether individuals follow the formal rules legis-
lated by governments will depend to a large extent on the 
alignment between formal rules and informal norms of 
conduct. 
One of the goals of policy reform must be to identify the 
overlap (or lack thereof) between the formal and the infor-
mal rules in order to minimize the enforcement costs of the 
formal legal system. The enforcement arrangements are 
part of what defines institutions and thus are an essential 
component of institution building.  
Where there is an overlap between the formal and the 
informal, enforcement costs will be lower than when there 
is none. The goal of sustainable policy reform should be to 
encourage this overlap when possible8. 
While it is true that stable and predictable institutions 
are necessary if they are to fulfill their function, both for-
mal and informal institutions can change or evolve over 
time. Those that are designed can be amended or reformed 
and those that are not formally created evolve spontane-
ously based on how useful they are to the individuals in 
society. 
Informal rules are difficult to influence, at least in the 
short run. They are nonetheless important to understand-
ing the limits of institution building because ignoring the 
informal rules always makes it more costly to enforce the 
formal ones. The design of formal institutions requires that 
policy makers pay attention to existing informal institu-
                                                             
7 In his book The Other Path (New York: Harper and Row Pub-
lishers) published in 1989, Hernando De Soto provides many 
examples of costly enforcement of formal rules. See for instance 
his examples on informal housing. Another example is jaywalk-
ing in the U.S. While the law (i.e. formal rule) bans jaywalking, 
it is often cost effective for individuals to cross streets in places 
where they are not supposed to cross. While some jaywalking 
may be curbed by the existence of the law, it would be too costly 
to strictly enforce it. 
8 The exception being when informal norms are not conducive to 
social progress. How to determine whether this is the case and 
what to do about it are difficult but very important questions. 
This Policy Primer argues that the impact on the “gains from 
trade” should be the main benchmark used to judge rules and 
norms that individuals follow. 
tions because of the consequences for economic perfor-
mance9. 
Entrepreneurship 
Entrepreneurship is the ultimate source of change in the 
economic system and economists increasingly attribute a 
large role to the entrepreneur when explaining economic 
performance. This section describes the entrepreneurial 
function and why this function is the source of economic 
development. 
The problem of poverty and development is not that en-
trepreneurship is abundant in some countries and lacking 
in others. Entrepreneurial activity is never in short sup-
ply.9 Entrepreneurship encompasses not only exceptional 
risk-taking activities (e.g. setting up firms) but also many 
mundane activities both within and outside organizations. 
This is because entrepreneurship is about creation and 
discovery: something that every individual is capable of to 
some degree. Entrepreneurial behavior is not dependent on 
culture or race, it can be observed in every society and 
across all ethnicities. Creation and discovery can exist in 
non-commercial contexts. However, what matters to policy 
is entrepreneurial activity in the social context of market 
exchange. 
Traditionally economists have viewed the challenge of 
economic growth as an issue of overcoming the problem of 
diminishing returns (i.e. the continued use of a resource 
produces less and less output). In theory, the solution to 
this problem lies in the existence of mechanisms (e.g. edu-
cation, research, infrastructure, etc.) that increase produc-
tivity (i.e. over time more is produced with less). But what 
has been lacking is an explanation for how increases in 
productivity are actually achieved. 
The answer to this problem lies in understanding that 
productivity increases are increases in the amount of so-
cially useful knowledge. In other words, the source of 
changes in productivity lies in the increase in knowledge 
that entrepreneurial activity generates: the tyranny of di-
minishing returns is overcome by human ingenuity dis-
played in entrepreneurship. 
The recognition of entrepreneurship as the engine of 
growth leads to the following fundamental question: if en-
trepreneurship is never in short supply and is the ultimate 
source of economic growth, why are some countries rich 
while others are poor? 
Why institutions matter to entrepreneurship? 
We saw above that no one can play tennis without for-
mal and informal rules. What defines tennis is not only the 
use of a racket and balls but also the rules that players fol-
                                                             
9 The informal rules are part of what one may call “culture” or 
what economists also call “civic capital” or “metis” (common 
knowledge). Informal norms may be influenced in the long run 
by the formal institutional framework. However, informal rules 
almost always take priority in the short run. This is where the 
difficulty with culture lies: it is fundamental to the success of 
reforms but it is difficult to change and affect. For more on the 
subject see “Why Culture Matters: Economics, Politics, and the 
Imprint of History” by Peter Boettke (reprinted in Peter Boettke 
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low. Similarly, entrepreneurship cannot exist without rules: 
what matters to entrepreneurship is not only the discovery 
and exploitation of a profit opportunity but also that this 
process takes place in the context of rules that structure the 
way the economic game is played. 
For this reason, institutions matter for economic per-
formance. In order to understand the performance of econ-
omies, one must look at the nature of the formal and in-
formal institutions that operate because these rules affect 
the type of entrepreneurial activity that takes place. 
As mentioned above, entrepreneurship is traditionally 
understood in the social context. This means that entrepre-
neurial discoveries will tend to be socially beneficial (i.e. 
they benefit all the parties to the exchange, and, by creating 
further opportunities for other entrepreneurs, they benefit 
others not directly involved). Entrepreneurs discover un-
known gains from exchange through the discovery of profit 
opportunities. As such, the process of discovery relies pri-
marily on the existence of profits10. 
However, profits do not exist in a vacuum; they proceed 
from the existence of institutions. Therefore the institu-
tional arrangements that govern the existence of profits 
will determine the nature of entrepreneurship. 
The puzzle, as stated above is this: since entrepreneur-
ship is never in short supply, why do some countries seem 
to benefit from entrepreneurial activity while others lan-
guish? 
The response lies in recognizing that while entrepre-
neurship is always present it may not always be directed 
towards socially productive activities. This will depend on 
the incentives created as a result of the formal and informal 
institutions that exist in a society11. The formal legal system 
provides the basic structure around which entrepreneurial 
activity is organized. Depending on the nature of the formal 
institutions, entrepreneurship will be directed towards 
either one (or more) of these three types of activities: 
▪ productive activities; 
▪ evasive activities; and/or, 
▪ socially destructive activities. 
In this case, the formal institutions reflect the informal 
norms of conduct and provide incentives for entrepreneurs 
to discover and capture socially beneficial opportunities. 
Formal institutions define and enforce property rights over 
goods and services that are exchanged. The enforcement 
costs of the formal legal system are low and society benefits 
from productive entrepreneurship as entrepreneurs dis-
cover and exploit profit opportunities. 
In this second case, formal institutions provide incen-
tives for entrepreneurs to ignore, and thus avoid, the for-
                                                             
10 On the role of profit and entrepreneurial alertness to profit 
opportunities, see the work of Israel Kirzner, especially Compe-
tition and Entrepreneurship, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1973. 
11 For an exploration of the subject see for instance Peter Boettke 
and Christopher Coyne (2003) “Entrepreneurship and Devel-
opment: Cause or Consequence?” Advances in Austrian Eco-
nomics, vol. 6, 67-87; and Christopher Coyne and Peter Leeson 
(2004) “The Plight of Underdeveloped Countries” Cato Journal, 
vol. 24(3), 235-249. 
mal institutional framework. This is because the formal 
legal system reduces the value of the gains from exchange 
and thus drives individuals out of formal arrangements. 
Most commonly, this corresponds to situations where taxa-
tion and regulation are high or where legislation is unstable 
and doesn’t provide the necessary certainty for exchange 
and investment to take place (property rights, thus under-
stood, are weak or uncertain). Evasive entrepreneurship is 
costly to society since entrepreneurs, as they go under-
ground to continue exploiting socially productive opportu-
nities, must allocate resources to avoiding the formal sys-
tem. These resources could have otherwise been employed 
in productive activities. 
Socially destructive entrepreneurship occurs when soci-
ety offers incentives to engage in socially destructive activi-
ties (i.e. zero or negative-sum games)12. Rent-seeking (i.e. 
obtaining revenues through activities that are protected by 
legislation and at the expense of consumers and taxpayers) 
and theft are the most common examples. If formal institu-
tions are not stable and/or can be manipulated to one’s 
gain, they create incentives to engage in the exploitation of 
the formal rules by predating over those who engage in 
socially productive activities. 
The formal and informal institutional environment in 
which entrepreneurs operate will influence how entrepre-
neurs use resources at their disposal. Entrepreneurship is 
not dependent on the resources in an economy. Rather, the 
key is the quality of institutions that permit the exploitation 
of resources and opportunities. 
Individuals and the rules they follow are the ultimate 
resources to which economists and policy makers must pay 
attention. In the final analysis it is neither the distance to 
markets and commercial centers nor the amount of natural 
resources that a country possesses, which make a country 
economically vibrant. It is the extent to which formal and 
informal institutions (and their enforcement arrange-
ments) direct entrepreneurship towards socially productive 
activities. 
The fundamental message of the analysis above is that 
different institutional frameworks offer different incentives 
for entrepreneurs. This also means that the knowledge 
generated by entrepreneurial activity will vary depending 
on the institutional background of society. Ultimately, the 
issue of institutions and entrepreneurship is an issue of the 
generation of knowledge that is necessary for productivity 
increases to take place and for individual plans to become 
better coordinated. My claim is that only a society with an 
institutional environment that favors productive entrepre-
neurship can generate the knowledge necessary for con-
stant productivity increases and effective coordination of 
individual activity. 
3. An example from the field: entrepreneurship 
in Romania 
The Mercatus Center has studied the issues addressed 
above (the small overlap between the informal and the 
formal, the different types of entrepreneurship, etc.) in 
                                                             
12 “Zero or negative sum games” correspond to situations where 
no gains emerge from social interaction. 
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Romania13. The difficulties experienced by many transition 
economies in Eastern Europe can be directly linked to defi-
ciencies in their formal institutional structure. Romania is 
a specific example of this general problem. 
The obstacles on the way to prosperity in Romania, as in 
so many developing and transitioning countries, stem from 
the nature of the formal institutional structure. In many 
cases, the payoffs offered for unproductive and evasive 
entrepreneurship in Romania are higher than those offered 
for productive activities. Among the issues that plague the 
economy are: corruption (i.e. evasion of formal institu-
tions), excessive and uncertain regulations, and random 
and ineffective enforcement of those regulations. 
Legal uncertainty 
Legal activism (i.e. the frequent issuance of legislation) 
can be observed in most countries and Romania is no ex-
ception. For instance, the Romanian government can issue 
“Emergency Ordinances” – immediately active decrees – 
which frequently change the rules of the game for entre-
preneurs. Between 1997 and 2000 for instance, 684 Emer-
gency Ordinances were issued representing 43% of all laws 
created during this period. Moreover, changes to the rules 
and the regulatory framework are often poorly drafted, 
vague, and can be contradictory. 
As a result of these constant changes in the formal regu-
latory framework, formal institutions, far from alleviating 
uncertainty, create additional uncertainty. Under these 
conditions, it is difficult for entrepreneurs to engage in 
forecast, planning and other necessary activities to conduct 
business. Surveys show that as a consequence only a quar-
ter of the Romanian population has trust in the govern-
ment and more than fifty percent consider most public 
officials to be corrupt. 
Romanian entrepreneurs indicated that regulations 
were numerous and often changing, and thus it is difficult 
to know what the law requires on any given day. Public 
officials also have problems finding their way through the 
legal uncertainty. It follows that the rules cannot be en-
forced well and the court system cannot operate effectively. 
In the case of dispute settlement for instance, entrepre-
neurs often rely on informal arrangements because of the 
inefficiency of the formal alternative. 
The black market 
Entrepreneurs who are alert to business opportunities 
must often pay officials bribes to obtain the appropriate 
permits, licenses and authorizations. They can also choose 
to evade formal institutions when doing business and this 
situation has created an informal sector. The most common 
forms of evasive activities are tax evasion (including under-
statement of revenue, tax on labor, etc.) and evasion of the 
formal legal process (to set up a new firm, to re-charter a 
company statute, etc.). Evasive entrepreneurship thrives as 
a reaction to the uncertainty created by the formal legal 
                                                             
13 See Paul Aligica, Peter Leeson and Christopher Coyne (2003) 
“Extending the Analysis: Romania” USAID Forum Series on the 
Role of Institutions in Promoting Economic Growth: 
http://www.mercatus.org/pdf/materials/433.pdf. See also 
Christopher Coyne and Peter Leeson (2004) 
system. This is costly to society because, on the one hand, 
entrepreneurs allocate resources to avoid the formal system 
that could have been used for productive activities and, on 
the other, the enforcement costs of formal institutions are 
much higher than they need to be. 
Rent seeking 
Because formal laws change all the time and the legisla-
tive process is susceptible to external influences by pres-
sure groups and powerful individuals, it makes sense for 
individuals to try to affect those changes in their favor. The 
incentives for entrepreneurs are directed towards rent 
seeking in order to obtain privileges from those in positions 
of power. Such a context is perfect for the flourishing of 
unproductive or even socially destructive entrepreneurship, 
where some individuals engage in negative or zero-sum 
games by destroying resources that would have been useful 
to other market participants. 
Productive entrepreneurship in Romania is hampered 
by the fact that formal institutions only partially fulfill their 
function which is to reduce the uncertainty of social inter-
action by providing a guide to social intercourse. When this 
guiding function is inoperative or diminished and the in-
centives for entrepreneurship are distorted towards socially 
wasteful activities, economic growth is stifled and the 
economy may stagnate or even retrogress. 
Entrepreneurial activity is not lacking in Romania and 
neither are entrepreneurs, but the formal rules of the eco-
nomic game are poorly defined, so that entrepreneurship is 
directed towards unproductive activities. 
4. Implications for development policy 
The analysis above and the example of Romania lead us 
to important conclusions about the role of institutions in 
fostering entrepreneurship. Formal institutions can be 
designed to offer incentives to engage in productive activi-
ties but they may also render productive activities too cost-
ly with regard to alternatives. Badly designed formal insti-
tutions and institution building that does not take into 
account the gap between formal and informal rules create 
incentives for individuals to: 
▪ Evade the formal legal system and follow conflicting in-
formal norms of conduct; 
▪ Engage in unproductive or even socially destructive activ-
ities. 
Ultimately what matters to economic policy is the reali-
ty of the incentives entrepreneurs experience. Since entre-
preneurship is never in short supply, the overall implica-
tion of the analysis above is that effective policy should 
always aim at making unproductive activities more costly 
to engage in than productive activities. Economic develop-
ment and growth require that incentives direct entrepre-
neurial activity to productive not unproductive opportuni-
ties. 
However, implementation of good policy is not easy be-
cause obstacles stand in the way of good policy reform. The 
wrong incentives are often given to reformers who can pri-
vately gain from catering to special interests as opposed to 
adopting policies beneficial to society. This last section 
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incentives that society provides to entrepreneurs) can fol-
low. The overarching idea is that the goal of economic poli-
cy must be to change the relative payoffs society offers to 
entrepreneurs in order to foster productive entrepreneur-
ship. 
Policy implication #1: define the starting point 
for reform 
Before attempting reform aimed at changing the relative 
payoffs available to entrepreneurs, it is necessary to estab-
lish a credible baseline, or “starting point” that considers 
the formal as well as the informal institutions within which 
entrepreneurs operate. 
A credible assessment and accurate account of the start-
ing point for reform that reflects the perceptions of key 
economic actors is crucial because: 
▪ Reforms will need to be tailored to the actual situation in 
a given country, and general recipes for reform may not be 
adapted to the local circumstances and therefore will not 
“stick”; and, 
▪ Reforms have the potential of making things worse if ill-
adapted to the situation. Moreover, without an accurate 
baseline there is no way to measure success or failure and 
problems can be generated from reforms without policy 
makers ever knowing about them. 
A detailed knowledge of the actual incentives entrepre-
neurs face in their activity is necessary to define a starting 
point. This can only be obtained by speaking to the people 
who are involved in business activities in the country of 
concern. Law books are useful to know what the formal 
incentives are. However, one cannot only rely on them to 
understand the incentives and the rules that entrepreneurs 
follow on the terrain. Detailed surveys of entrepreneurs are 
crucial to establish the real nature of the incentives they 
face. 
Interviewing entrepreneurs helps uncover the preva-
lence of unproductive and evasive entrepreneurship. The 
lack of overlap between formal and informal institutions is 
a good signal that the formal legal structure is stifling for 
economic development and growth. The definition of the 
starting point helps establish the nature and the extent of 
the problem faced by policy reformers. 
This first policy implication may seem obvious but poli-
cy makers frequently lack a relevant baseline when initiat-
ing reforms or merely rely on a formal account of the insti-
tutional environment contained in legislation. One way to 
check this is by always asking the following questions: 
▪ Do I know how things actually are in the country of con-
cern? 
▪ How do I know (i.e.: where does my information come 
from and do I trust that it reflects the “real life” economy in 
the country of concern)? 
Policy implication #2: Institutional capacity 
building 
While defining the current situation, one also needs to 
set in place the conditions under which institutional change 
and capacity building can occur. The main reason for insti-
tutional capacity building is to generate policy ownership 
such that change is seen to be organic and driven towards 
goals that are desired and beneficial to the local population. 
Adoption of policies identified by outsiders is often difficult 
to achieve, as interest groups and institutional inertia sup-
port the status quo. The difficulty is to find the agents of 
change within the population that can rally the populace 
around the necessary reform. The commitment of national 
leaders to reforms is necessary. Also, identifying informal 
institutions aligned with proposed reforms can help 
achieve policy ownership because these norms of conduct 
are accepted by the local population as means of coordinat-
ing activities and solving conflicts. 
Mapping institutional stakeholders will help identify 
who is entrenched in decision-making positions. Political 
mapping identifies the groups (whether they work for the 
state or they are private parties) that have an interest in 
using the law to concentrate the benefits in their hands 
while dispersing the costs over the entire population. Polit-
ical mapping allows reformers to manage the opposition to 
reform by making it less painful for those who are losing 
most (e.g. through the grandfathering of certain policies, 
etc.). Identifying the various interest groups requires on the 
ground work with people in civil society and in govern-
ment. While it may be arduous, it is a relatively inexpensive 
exercise and will provide critical information regarding the 
feasibility of the reforms. 
The next step is to implement policies that favor pro-
ductive entrepreneurship and to remove those that provide 
incentives for socially destructive entrepreneurial activity. 
The overarching goal of public policy must be to reduce the 
relative cost of engaging in socially beneficial entrepre-
neurship. The engine of development and growth is pro-
ductive entrepreneurship. One must provide the correct 
environment for entrepreneurs to create wealth if reforms 
are to be successful. 
The main implication of the analysis above is that the 
formal legal system must be reformed in order to establish 
a property rights environment that provides clearly de-
fined, fully tradable, real, and personal property rights that 
are alienable and defendable in impartial tribunals. While 
establishing a well-defined and encompassing property 
right environment will not solve all the ills of developing 
nations, it will go further than policies that overlook the 
importance of property rights. 
The pitfall to avoid in designing policies is to try to pro-
vide direct help for entrepreneurs. Neither old-style indus-
trial policy nor financial help from the government is what 
is required. Policy reforms that favor socially productive 
entrepreneurship should primarily aim at defining and 
enforcing institutions. 
This Policy Primer argues that institutions are not the 
fad of the moment but are fundamental to the existence of 
a vibrant and productive entrepreneurial activity. Institu-
tions are defined as the rules of the economic game and 
their enforcement arrangements. Entrepreneurial activity 
is about creation and discovery in the commercial context, 
that is, within the price system with the guidance of the 
profit-and-loss mechanism. 
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What matters to economic performance is a set of insti-
tutions that favor socially productive entrepreneurship. 
The problem with most developing countries is not that 
entrepreneurial activity is missing but that it is misdirected 
into socially destructive activities. The aim of economic 
policy and social reform must be to re-establish an institu-
tional framework that allows for socially productive entre-
preneurial activity to flourish. The Policy Primer offers 
three policy implications: 
▪ Define a starting point for reform; 
▪ Build institutional capacity; 
▪ Prepare an environment that favors productive entrepre-
neurship. 
In spite of the uncertainty surrounding the path to re-
form, it is important to keep in mind that the quality of the 
formal and informal institutions are the main determinant 
of productive entrepreneurship. Institutions are not just 
the latest buzzword in development economics; they are 
the crucial and unavoidable foundation upon which socie-
ties develop and grow. 
 
 
 
